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NEWSMAN'S PRIVILEGE: THE FIRST AMENDMENT GRANTS NONE
United States v. Caldwell, 408 U.S. 665 (1972)
A black news reporter, specializing in reporting on the Black Panther
Party, was subpoenaed before the Grand Jury of the United States District
Court for the Northern District of California., The grand jury was investigating the Black Panther Party's possible involvement in federal criminal
activities. 2 Alleging that disclosure of his confidential sources would impair
his ability to gather news from informants and thus violate his first amendment rights, petitioner sought to quash the subpoena or alternatively to
limit the scope of the inquiry in order to protect his sources. The district
court granted a restrictive injunction but refused to excuse the reporter from
testifying.3 Petitioner appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which
held he need not testify on the basis of a newsman's qualified privilege inherent in the first amendment's guarantee of freedom of the press. 4 On appeal" the Supreme Court reversed and HELD, requiring newsmen to appear
and testify before state and federal grand juries does not abridge freedom of
6
speech and press guaranteed by the first amendment.
It is firmly rooted in our jurisprudence that unless specially privileged,

1. The subpoena sought to compel production of notes and tape recordings of
interviews with officers and spokesmen of the Black Panther Party concerning the party's
aims, purposes, and activities. 408 U.S. 675 (1972).
2. The grand jury investigation was concerned, inter alia, with possible violations of
the United States Code. 18 U.S.C. §871 (1970) (threats against the President), §1751 (assassination, attempts to assassinate, conspiracy to assassinate the President), §231 (civil disorder), §2101 (interstate travel to incite disorders), §1341 (mail frauds and swindles). A
publicly televised speech in which an officer of the Panthers declared: "We will kill
Richard Nixon" and the fact that this threat had been repeated in three subsequent
issues of the Party newspaper prompted the investigation. Other newspaper articles, including some by Caldwell, had stated that "in their roles as the vanguard in a revolutionary
struggle the Panthers had picked up guns" and quoted their chief of staff as declaring:
"We advocate the very direct overthrow of the Government by way of force and violence."
Id. at 677.
3. Application of Caldwell, 311 F. Supp. 358 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
4. Caldwell v. United States, 434 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1970).
5. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in two cases opposing Caldwell, which involved the same issues. Branzburg v. Pound, 461 S.W.2d 345 (Ky. 1970) (holding reporters
have no privilege in general and that neither the Kentucky privilege statute nor the first
amendment permit a reporter to refuse totestify about events he observed personally); and
In re Pappas,
Mass.
, 266 N.E.2d 297 (1971) (holding that testimonial privileges
were "exceptional" and "limited," stating that "[t]he principle that the public 'has a
right to every man's evidence"' had usually been preferred to countervailing interests).
6. The two companion cases to Caldwell were affirmed. 408 U.S. 665 (1972). For discussions of the lower court decisions in this area see Note, Reporter's Privilege Under
the First Amendment, 86 ALBANY L. REv. 404 (1972); Note, The Reporter's Privileges Perspectives on the Constitutional Argument, 32 OHIo ST. L.J. 340 (1971); Note, First Amendment Protection of the News Media: Caldwell v. United States, 3 RurcEms-C xmu L.J. 46
(1971); Note, The Newsman's Privilege and the Constitution, 23 S.C..Q. 436 (1971).
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every individual must give testimony when properly summoned. 7 This stems
from the general principle that "the public ... has a right to every man's
evidence." 8 The objective of this principle is to obtain reliable evidence,
thereby ensuring swift and efficient administration of justice. 9 Exceptions are
recognized only when the public interest in maintaining a confidential relationship outweighs the countervailing societal interest in the proper administration of justice.1° Such public interests have been found in attorney-client,
husband-wife, physician-patient, and priest-penitent relationships. 1' Although
journalists have asserted a privilege to conceal confidential sources of information,' 2 courts have consistently refused to recognize a common law journalist-informant privilege.-3 As a result, journalists are compelled to disclose
information acquired in their professional capacity except when a privilege
4
of nondisclosure is provided by statute.1

7. 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §2286 (McNaughton rev. 1961). For the common law treatment by other English-speaking jurisdictions see cases collected and discussed in Carter,
The Journalist,His Informant and Testimonial Privilege, 35 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1111 (1960).
8. "Attending a court or grand jury in order to testify is a public duty; the personal
sacrifice required is a necessary contribution of the individual to the public welfare." Blair
v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 281 (1919). "It is . . . beyond controversy that one of the
duties which the citizen owes to his government is to support the administration of justice
by attending its courts and giving his testimony whenever he is properly summoned."
Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 438 (1932).
9. See, e.g., Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273 (1919).
10. "The prevailing tendency is to restrict the classes of persons exempted under a
privilege of non-disclosure." See 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §2192 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
"Every exemption from testifying or producing records thus presupposes a very real interest
to be protected. If a privilege based upon that interest is asserted, its validity must be
assessed." United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 332 (1950).
11. These privileges are provided to preserve socially valuable relationships. See generally Guest 8c Stanzler, The Constitutional Argument for Newsmen Concealing Their
Sources, 64 Nw. U.L. REV. 18, 26-29 (1969).
12. G. BIRD & F. MERWIN, THE NEWSPAPER AND SoCIErY 567 (1942).
13. See, e.g., Burdick v. United States, 236 U.S. 79 (1915) (forced disclosure would constitute self-incrimination); Brewster v. Boston Herald-Traveler Corp., 20 F.R.D. 416 (D.
Mass. 1957) (the journalist's information would not be relevant to the proceedings); Clien
v. State, 52 So. 2d 117 (Fla. 1950) (recognition of a common law privilege has been urged
on grounds that disclosure would violate the newsman's code of ethics); Plunkett v.
Hamilton, 136 Ga. 72, 70 S.E. 781 (1911) (forfeiture of estate would result from answering
the questions); People ex rel. Phelps v. Fancher, 2 Hun 226 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1874) (employer's
regulations would be violated by disclosure). For a discussion of judicial repudiation of the
privilege see D'Alemberte, Journalists Under the Axe: Protection of Confidential Sources
of Information, 6 HARV. J. LEGIS. 307, 314-22 (1969).
14. Currently seventeen states have provided various types of statutory protection for
newsmen. ALA. CODE tit. 7, §370 (1960); ALAsKA STAT. §09.25-150 (Supp. 1970); A=z. REy.
STAT. ANN. §12-2237 (Supp. 1970); Alu. STAT. ANN. §43-917 (1964); CAL. Evm. CODE ANN.
§1070 (West 1966); IND. ANN. STAT. §2-1733 (1968); Ky. REv. STAT. §421.100 (1969); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§45:1451-54 (Cum.Supp. 1970); MD. ANN. CODE art. 35, §2 (1971); MICH.
COMp. LAws ANN. §767.5a (1968); MONT. REv. CoDEs ANN. tit. 93, ch. 601-02 (1964); N.J.
REv. STAT. §2A:84A-21 (Supp. 1970); N.M. STAT. ANN. §20-1-12.1 (Supp. 1969); N.Y. CrV.
RIGHTs LAW §79-h (McKinney Supp. 1970); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §§2739.04-.12 (Page
Supp. 1970) PA. STAr. tit. 28, §330 (Supp. 1970); NEV. REv. STAT. §48.087 (1969). Since
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The claim of journalist's privilege received its first extensive treatment
in Garland v. Torte.'5 There, a journalist asserted that compulsory disclosure
of confidential sources would restrain the flow of news from these sources
to the press and thus diminish the flow of news to the public. 6 The court conceded that in some circumstances compulsory disclosure may abridge freedom
of the press,' 7 but nevertheless concluded the journalist in question had no
constitutional privilege of nondisclosure.' 8 In fact, prior to the instant case
every court faced with the contention that the first amendment affords a
newsman 9 the right to withhold names of or information received from confidential sources has expressly rejected such argument. 20 In each case, the courts
have directly or indirectly noted that the fair administration of justice
1
is hindered by such an extension of first amendment rights.2
The Ninth Circuit based its decision upon the proposition that a newsman had a qualified constitutional privilege under the first amendment to
refuse to disclose his sources. 22 Therefore, the court reasoned the Government must show a "compelling state interest" to overcome this qualified

these statutes are in derogation of the common law they are narrowly construed by the
courts. See, e.g., State v. Donovan, 129 N.J.L. 478, 30 A.2d (1943).
15. 259 F. 2d 545 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 910 (1958).
16. Id. at 547-48.
17. Traditionally, freedom of the press has served as a protection against prior
restraints or censorship. Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931). The
purpose of the freedom is "to preserve an untrammeled press as a vital source of public
information." Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.. 233, 250 (1936). Thus, the first
amendment "rests on the assumption that the widest possible dissemination of information
from diverse and antagonistic sources is essential to the welfare of the public." Associated
Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945). The Supreme Court has indicated that freedom of the press is to be given "the broadest scope that (can] be countenanced in an
orderly society." Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 265 (1941). It encompasses "not only
the right to ...print, but the right to distribute, the right to receive, the right to read."
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 US. 479, 482 (1965).
18. The court stated that freedom of the press "must give place under the Constitution
to a paramount public interest in the fair administration of justice." 259 F.2d 545, 549 (2d
Cir. 1968). The Ninth Circuit court, however, distinguished the result in Garland by stating
that the information desired went to the heart of the plaintiffs case. Garland v. Torre, 259
F.2d 545 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 910 (1958).
19. The reporter is the person who directly receives the protection. "Mit would be
difficult to rationalize a rule that would create special constitutional rights for those
possessing credentials as newsgatherers which would not conflict with the . . . equalprotection concepts also found in the Constitution.' State v. Buchanan, 250 Ore. 244, 248,
436 P.2d 729, 731 (1968).
20. Garland v. Torre, 259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 910 (1958); In re
Goodfader's Appeal, 45 Hawaii 317, 367 P.2d 472 (1961); In re Taylor, 412 Pa. 32, 193 A.2d
181 (1963).
21. See, e.g., Garland v. Torre, 259 F.2d 545, 549 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 US. 910
(1958).
22. See Caldwell v. United States, 434 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1970), rev'd, 408 U.S.
665 (1972). The press was free to refuse to disclose information. In order to force
disclosure, the party had to show his interests were greater than interests of the press.
Thus, there was a qualified privilege to overcome. Id.
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privilege.23 The rationale for the privilege was based upon implications
drawn by the Ninth Circuit from New York Times Co. v. Sullivan24 and
Time, Inc. v. Hill,25 indicating that the first amendment rights of the press

outweighed the rights of individuals, thus creating the qualified privilege
26
concept.
In reversing the Ninth Circuit, the Supreme Court concluded 27 that the
Constitution does not grant a privilege to newsmen. Thus, there need be no
showing of "compelling" governmental interest before requiring disclosure-2s
The significant relationship between first amendment freedoms and the
country's welfare was not questioned,29 nor did the Court suggest that news
gathering is excluded from first amendment protection.3" The Court merely
noted the instant case involved neither a direct restraint or restriction on
what the press may publish nor an expressed or implied command that the
press publish what it prefers to withhold. While enforcement of civil and
criminal statutes of general applicability result in an incidental burdening of
the press, 3 1 incidental burdens have often been upheld when the press had

no special exemption from performing the general duties imposed by such
32

statutes.

The Court emphasized that fair and effective law enforcement to provide
security for the person and property is a fundamental function of government. 33 The grand jury plays an important, constitutionally mandated role in
that process. 34 Hence, the public interest in law enforcement superseded
the consequential but uncertain burden on news gathering in the principal

23.

Id.

24. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
25. 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
26. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 US.
254 (1964). The rationale for the extension was that, since rights of the individual could
be superseded by those of the press, the individual had the burden of showing his interests
were greater than those of the press. This requirement was, in effect, a privilege that the
individual had to overcome. Thus, it was reasoned that the Government stood in the same
position as an individual. Caldwell v. United States, 434 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1970), reu'd,
408 U.S. 665 (1972).
27. 408 U.S. at 665.
28.

Id.

29. Id. at 681.
30. The Court stated that without some protection for seeking out news, freedom of
the press could be eviscerated. Id.
31. Id.
32. Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265 (1971) (press not free to publish anything
and everything it desires with impunity); Citizens Publishing Co. v. United States, 394 U.S.
131 (1969) (application of Fair Labor Standards Act to newspaper would not abridge
freedom of press); accord, Mabee v. White Plains Publishing Co., 327 U.S. 178 (1946);
Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103 (1937) (newsmen have no special privilege to invade the rights and liberties of others); Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233
(1936) (newspaper may be subjected to nondiscriminatory form of taxation).
33. 408 U.S. at 690.
34. See, e.g., Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. (1956).
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case.35 Moreover, the Court stated that the majority of confidential relationships between reporters and their sources is not threatened by this governmental function.ss
Only where sources themselves are implicated in a crime or possess information relevant to the grand jury's task need they or the reported fear subpoenas. The statistics before the court indicated such circumstances exist
in only a small percentage of all confidential news. 37 Furthermore, the preference for anonymity of those confidential informants involved in actual
criminal conduct is a product of their desire to escape prosecution. This
preference, while understandable, is hardly deserving of constitutional protection, s s and is not sufficient to override the interest of the public in ensuring
that neither reporter nor source invades the rights of other citizens.39Thus,
the Court concluded that the public interest in possible future news about
crime from undisclosed, unverified sources does not take precedence over the
public interest in pursuing and prosecuting those crimes reported to the
press by informants. The Court also noted that an agreement to conceal in40
formation relevant to the commission of a crime is contrary to public policy.
The argument that all indirect burdens on freedom of the press violate
the first amendment was refuted by the Court.41 It noted that first amendment
freedoms are not absolute, 42 and that subpoenaing newsmen to testify bears
a reasonable relationship to the achievement of the governmental purposes asserted. 43 Hence, the indirect burdens satisfy the historical test for infringment upon first amendment rights. In addition, society's interest is best
served by thorough and extensive investigation.44
The Court, however, made it clear that the judiciary would be available
to newsmen under circumstances in which legitimate first amendment interests require protection. 4s These circumstances include harassment of news35. The Court based its appraisal of the burden on the empirical study by Professor
Blasi to ascertain the effects of these subpoenas on newsmen. See Blasi, The Newsman's
Privilege: An Empirical Study, 70 MicH. L. Rv. 229 (1971). This survey found only half
of the 975 reporters questioned relied on regular confidential sources for 10% or more of

their sources, and of this group only 8% were able to say with some certainty that their
professional functioning had been adversely affected by the threat of subpoena. Id. at 247-51.

36. 408 U.S. at 691.
37. See Blasi, supra note 35, at 247-51.

38. 408 U.S. at 691.
39. See Toledo Newspaper Co. v. United States, 247 U.S. 402 (1918).

40. Bratton v. United States, 73 F.2d 795 (10th Cir. 1934). Such an agreement may
constitute the crime of misprision of felony. See 18 U.S.C.A. §4 (1970).
41. 408 US. at 700.
42. See, e.g., Schenk v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
43. Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960).
44. See Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411 (1969); Wood v. Georgia, 370 US. 375
(1962); Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359 (1956). Furthermore, the Court stated that
not even the confidential law enforcement informer was immune from testifying if his
testimony were necessary to promote a complete investigation. See Smith v. Illinois, 390 U.S.
120 (1968); McGray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300 (1967); Rovario v. United States, 353 US.

53 (1957).
45. 408 US. 709 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring).
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men, grand jury investigations conducted in bad faith and subpoenaing
reporters where there is only a tenuous relationship between the information
sought and the subject of the investigation.46 The claim of privilege in these

circumstances should be judged on its facts. A balance must be maintained
between freedom of the press and the obligation of citizens to give relevant
testimony about criminal conduct. The balancing of constitutional and
societal interests on a case-by-case basis accords with the traditional
method of adjudicating such questions.47 The Court stated that the solicitude
shown first amendment rights in the past4" would continue to exist and this
49
would assure that the rights of the press would not be balanced away.
While the Court thoroughly examined the problem of interference with
the grant jury process, it virtually ignored the major policy arguments for
the privilege. The Court has often stated that the first amendment protects
the right to receive information and ideas.5- In attempting to extend this
rationale, the Ninth Circuit contended that the "drying up" of sources caused
by reporters being forced to testify would be an indirect restraint on the
media's right to receive information and ideas. 51 This restraint would result
in an invasion of the public's right to be informed because it is directly
dependent upon the media's unfettered right to receive information. The
effect would be a contraction of the spectrum of available knowledge to the
public: 52 a violation of the first amendment.

53

In addition, the Court has long recognized the important role played by
associational privacy and anonymity in the protection of first amendment
interests. 54 Political anonymity enables dissenters to criticize officials and
policies without fear of reprisals, and has long been recognized as necessary
for the protection of constitutionally guaranteed freedoms. 55 While petitioner
argued that the effect of not granting a reporter privilege would be a

46. Id.
47. See, e.g., Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U.S. 72 (1959); Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S.
485 (1952).
48. See, e.g., Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 (1963); NAACP v. Alabama,
371 U.S. 449 (1958).
49. The Court stated there is much force in the pragmatic view that the press has at
its disposal powerful mechanisms of communication and is far from helpless to defend
itself. 408 U.S. at 706.
50. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969); Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301
(1965); Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943); Brooks v. Auburn University, 296
F. Supp. 188 (M.D. Ala. 1969), afJ'd, 412 F.2d 1171 (5th Cir. 1969); Snyder v. Board
of Trustees, 286 F. Supp. 927 (N.D. Ill. 1968); Stacy v. Williams, 306 F. Supp. 963 (N.D.
Miss. 1969).
51. Caldwell v. United States, 434 F.2d 108 (9th Cir. 1970).
52. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965).
53. Id.
54. Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539 (1963); Sheldon v.
Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960); Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama,
357 U.S. 449 (1958). See generally Comment, The Constitutional Right of Anonymity: Free
Speech, Disclosure and the Devil, 70 YArE L.J. 1084 (1961).
55. Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 64-65 (1960).
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"chilling effect" on these dissident groups' associational privacy and anonymity, the instant Court did not specifically consider these arguments.
While the Court did not create a newsman's privilege, it indicated that
the holding in the instant case was confined to its facts. 66 However, the limits
of the decision are not apparent, and there are no guidelines for applying
the proposed balancing test in future cases. By requiring application of the
balancing test without establishing guidelines, a substantial number of deleterious effects will exist. A large portion of these effects could have been
eliminated had the Court set up a procedure for applying the balancing
test similar to that proposed in People v. Dohrn.57 The Dohrn court ruled
that a subpoena could not be issued to a newsman except upon prior hearing.
At the hearing, the summoning party must prove: (1) probable cause to
believe that the newsman witness has information relevant to the subject
of the investigation; (2) the subpoena is the only way to get the evidence;
and (3) a miscarriage of justice would occur if the information sought was
not provided. 58 Thus, the burden would rest on the party issuing the subpoena
and all parties whose rights were infringed could be assured that the confidentiality of their relationship would not be balanced away in every instance.
With this type of procedure the Government would not jeopardize its interest. Furthermore, the reporter would be assured that the subpoena was
issued for only valid purposes, and he would not have to risk a contempt
sentence to determine its validity.5 9
The Court's decision denying a reporter privilege is the result of a valid
analysis of the competing policies involved.60 The Court, however, should
61
have adopted guidelines for applying the proposed balancing test. Such
omission will necessitate further litigation to ascertain where the balance
will be struck in different situations.62 The result will be an overly broad and
unnecessary "chilling effect" on the rights of all parties concerned.
JOSEPH W. BxAsry

56. 408 U.S. 665, 706-07 (1972).
57. Criminal No. 69-3808 (Cook County, Il. Cir. Ct. 1970).
58. Id. at 14.
59. This would bring the decision in line with prior decisions with respect to first
amendment rights. Cf. Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957).
60. See, e.g., State v. Knops, 49 Wis. 2d 647, 183 N.W.2d 93 (1971) (reporter of
underground newspaper claimed privilege not to disclose identity of persons responsible
for death of a student caused by bombing of campus.
61. The Supreme Court has said: "[T]he exercise of the power of compulsory process
[must] be carefully circumscribed when the investigative process tends to impinge upon ...
freedom of speech or press." Sweezey v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 245 (1957).
62. This will require a long period of time because the Court has stated that freedom
of the press is a personal right. See, e.g., Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214 (1966); Murdock
v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943). Thus, anyone performing an informative function is
protected and therefore the possible situations to be balanced are enormous (e.g., lecturers,
political polisters, novelists, academic researchers, and dramatists). 408 U.S. at 705.
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